Modernity posturing as bundle of (bundles of (bundles))
Modernity's (M) mounting troubles tell a persistent problem with the methodologies used by M-theorists.
These theories are propagated and legitimized without proper immanent critiques appealing to standards of reference, explanatory power and future predictability. In the last four posts we've presented theoretical conclusions that are not viable, such as M-normativity, Hegel's axiomatics, presentism, etc. We confront the same problem with M's main methodology: hermeneutics.
The basic tenet of the discipline is that of interpretation, understanding, etc. And here is the problem: interpretation, understanding, etc, are not enough to anchor truth. Theorists overlook that many of these inherited constructs are structurally epiphenomenal, which redundantly relate back to its material base. Heidegger has no choice but to recognize hermeneutics' raison d' être and re-frame it as structural:
The "circle" in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein—that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically, a circular structure.1We get it: Dasein has the ability to understand, and this ability is already —as it were— wired into Dasein. So, any understanding is bound to be Daseins' own! That Heidegger accepts that understanding is structural shows that circularity is an intractable problem for Hermeneutics. There's no way to validate one's understanding of the world beyond one's (own) understanding of the world.
Nothing against redundancy per se.
Once we pass hermeneutics' structural redundancy, we find that it's possible to build hermeneutic validity if we keep close attention to immanent standards of critique to rule out poor, or substandard interpretations. Admittedly, Heidegger's thesis in Being and Time opened up new avenues in the field of phenomenological research.
Here is a text by Umberto Eco, an expert in the history of hermeneutics. While in his early years Eco defended "open ended" interpretations, late Eco became more suspicious of what he saw as eroding standards of interpretation:
One can object that in order to define a bad interpretation one needs the criteria for defining a good interpretation. I think on the contrary that we can accept a sort of Popper-like principle according to which if there are no rules that help to ascertain which interpretations are the "best" ones, there is at least a rule for ascertaining which ones are "bad." (169)How to spot over-interpretation? Eco conceives of a model reader who would be able to discard some over-interpretations as ridiculous. We come back to the hermeneutic circle: understanding is a part-to-whole-to-part exercise. The model reader is capable to ask the right questions about the parts vs-a-vs the whole based on what she determines are the intentions of the text.
In our previous posts, we've hinted at hyper-objects as extremely large metaphysical entities, feeding on other entities.
Let's come back to M's paradigmatic definition:
... a bundle of processes that are cumulative and mutually reinforcing: to the (a) formation of capital and the mobilization of resources, to the (b) development of forces of production and the increase in the productivity of labor, to the establishment of (c) centralized political power and the formation of national identities, to the proliferation of rights of political participation, (e) of urban forms of life and of formal schooling, to the secularization of norms and so on (letters are mine).2A bundle of processes which makes for a ((bigger)) process.
the hyper-object as if justifies itself
Some stubborn questions
* If a "bundle of processes," why not a bundleofabundleofabundle, and so on? (let's call this the infinite regress problem)
* How does bundleofabundleofabundle remain the same through its changes? (let's call this change-over-persistence question)
* If a bundleofabundleofabundle is a sort of process activity, how does it supervenes over its parts? (let's call this the activity-over-substance question).
(A hyper-object can give one the creeps)
* How can M define itself as a "bundle of processes," while ultimately referring back to the processes constituting the processes? (let's call this the constitution paradox)
We're not being difficult. No question is of little value:
Categories relate to questions, not to answers!
The individuality of bundleofabundleofabundle cannot be explained out by invoking the very thing one needs to explain. We need to understand why all these bundles coalesce together through time, when they change.
Here is a schematic story of the making of M:
The theorist uses ad hoc methods with diverse received theories to describe his (our) socioeconomic present; the assembled "bundle of processes" so presented as the explanation of his present condition. Then as part of the received theory, the postulated M will not submit to a critique outside M. 3 Is this a good start for a reliable methodology? Is this the best M-theory can do ?
the gradual decay of M-theory
A brief history of M
a. At some point during early Nineteenth Century, German Romantics come up with the idea of "modern,"
b. Hegel brilliantly introduces axiomatics!
c. The effort to legitimize Hegel determines two opposing currents: Right and Young Hegelians struggle to give an account of M anchored in, what else, the present!
d. Marx/Engels develop political economy and dialectical materialism as eminent presentist disciplines.
e. Due to the contributions of Weber, Durkheim, Mead, etc, M-theory comes of age during the first fifty years of the Twentieth Century.
At each step of a. through e. we have a real shuffling of ideas: Given the early M-theory, anchored in metaphysics, history, teleology and Romantic literature, M-theorists proceed now to justify socio-historic and economic patterns in terms of bigger socio-economic and political processes, and in so doing they use more generalizations to ground previous ones. But bigger isn't better. In the end M becomes a rundown Paper Tiger, paralyzed by its inner unexplored peripheries and contradictions.
In PDM Habermas defends human rationality. What's interesting about his program is that it makes rationality an inherent capacity within language acquisition and expression. In other words, rationality expresses itself in our capacity for argumentation. And argumentation is grounded on validity claims which are vindicated by a process of inter-subjectivity.4 This communicative (argumentative) interaction of participants becomes a promising social cohesive force. Postmodernity appears and subverts these tenets with a discourse that is vitiated by self-contradiction. Reason has its flip side: the "other" of Reason, which, in the end, is actually, Reason. The problem is that Habermas makes M a cardboard model for rationality.
But M is, at bottom, a motley crew.
To make up for this aporia, M-theorists turn M into a hyper-object in the company of other hyper-objects, such as Capitalism, etc. (The hyper-object gang provides much needed esprit de corps).
Our approach is that hyper-objects should metaphysically answer to objects. An object, a thing, is a primitive. A required first step. Surely, objects get together with other objects to become big, sometimes very big. But we should talk about stuff that is actually at our empirical (or conceptual) level, instead of up above at some epiphenomenal level. We suggest to come back to a simple differentiation between what the object (thing) "is" and what we "make" of it. Of course, this is not the place to go into such detailed discussion of object/metaphysics.
A deflated idea of M:
* Like with any other historic period, let's deflate M to finite future bounds.
* M's self-imposed teleology is metaphysically redundant.4
* Self-normativity and M-normativity are goldbricks! From a normative standpoint, M has to be necessarily connected with previous historic periods. Normativity has to be trans-epochal.
* Instead of dwelling high and above at hyper-object level, the theorist should come down to earth and look at things. Don't rule by fiat.
* Make M less hyper-symptomatic and more predictive.5
* To avoid hyper-objects' recurrent redundancy, make them subordinate to objects (things).
Indeed, the present is real but it can be presented as a counterfactual to hyper-objects' redundant influence. For instance, one can conceive of a world without Modernity in it.6
What if Modernity is a fluke?
1 M. Heidegger's Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row, 1962) p.195. . 2 PDM, p. 2, Habermas enumerates the different influences of what we could call "the received theory of M": Baudelaire, Weber, Mead, Benjamin, Durkheim, Blumenberg, Koselleck, etc. See Hegel's axiomatics. 3 Suppose a theorist comes up with a theory in defense of "aura analysis." Suppose furthermore that there are many people don't fit the predicted patterns of "aura analysis." Rather than accept this fact as refuting evidence of the theory, the theorist presents a new category: the non-aureatic. Now, whenever the theory does not seem to work, the contrary evidence is systematically discounted! 4 Grounding validity claims intersubjectively grounds truth as coherence. Again, theoretical coherence alone is not enough to ground truth claims (whether as pseudo science or social consensus, as in here, here and here). 5 True, the future is unpredictable, but we have this and this to entertain comparative forecasts. 6 As well as other well known socio-economic hyper-objects, such as Capitalism, Terrorism, Globalization, etc.